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CHAPTER V 
CHINESE SOCIETY AND TRADITIONAL 
CHINESE CULTURE 
The unity and cohesiveness of traditional Chinese elite culture is 
striking and significant. But the gentry class, after all, comprised only about 
two percent of China's population in Ch'ing times. What about the other 
ninety-eight percent of society-including peasants, artisans, merchants, 
and service groups such as doctors, astrologers, and waiters? To what 
extent did they share the elite cultural vision we have been describing? 
In many respects, a great cultural gulf separated elite from commoner 
in traditional China. Members of the gentry class were entitled to special 
terms of address, special clothing and badges of rank, favorable legal 
treatment (including immunity from corporal punishment and exemption 
from being called as witnesses by commoners), official exemption from the 
labor service tax, and easy access to officialdom, which resulted in further 
preferential treatment. ' Frederic Wakeman has demonstrated effectively by 
means of parable how elite cultural common denominators, and not simply 
wealth, provided the key to power-wielding and power-holding in 
traditional China. 2 
But the cultural divide between elites and commoners in the Ch'ing 
period could be bridged in a number of ways. One way was the transmission 
of elite values to all sectors of society through the medium of vernacular 
literature-novels, dramas, short stories, shan-shu ("morality books"), 
pao-chiian ("precious scrolls"), and folk tales. All of these literary forms, 
like the orthodox classical literature and official historiography of the 
Chinese elite, were strongly didactic. 3 In the main, the message was Con-
fucian, even in such popular Buddhist and Religious Taoist tracts as the 
T'ai-shang kan-ying p'ien (Treatise of the Most Exalted One on Retribu-
tion), the Pu-fei-ch 'ien kung-te li (Meritorious Deeds at No Cost), and the 
Kuang-shan p 'ien kung-kuo ko (Ledger of Merit and Demerit for the Diffu-
sion of Good Deeds). 
Although based on the idea of divine retribution and buttressed by 
other religious ideas, these works used a great deal of elite symbolism, and 
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had a decidedly ethical, this-worldly cast. To be sure, they often contained 
admonitions to spare animal life, to show respect to sacred images, and 
"not to speak ill of Buddhist and Taoist monks"; but the importance in 
these tracts of family affairs, filial piety, loyalty to the ruler, obedience to 
the "principles of Heaven," social harmony, the avoidance of lawsuits, and 
even respect for paper with characters written on it, indicates a decidedly 
Confucian point of view. Furthermore, although Tadao Sakai rightly in-
dicates that works such as the Pu-fei-ch 'ien kung-te li classify meritorious 
deeds according to social class and specific occupational groupings, the 
striking feature of these works is the acceptance of a Confucian social 
hierarchy and the fact that "there is virtually no class consciousness or 
awareness of class interests to be asserted or defended.' •• 
One important reason for the relative lack of an awareness of "class 
interests" in late imperial China was the examination system. "The belief 
in the active possibility of social mobility-perhaps even more than the 
actual statistical incidence of it-kept the different levels of cultural life 
coherent and congruent, if not truly identical in quality and character, for 
each level of life was an active model to be imitated by the one below it."' 
Social mobility was, after all, no myth. In the Ming-Ch'ing period, for 
example, over forty percent of the upper degree holders (chin-shih and chii-
jen) came from families that had not produced an office holder or upper 
degree holder in the preceding three generations. 6 
The examinations were a special lure to the merchant class, which was 
traditionally disesteemed in Confucian thought and society. Stigmatized as 
unscrupulous and parasitic, merchants were chronically insecure. Insti-
tutionally, they lacked the power to command bureaucratic obedience; 
they had little protective commercial law, no political or organizational 
autonomy in urban areas, and no hope of operating large-scale business 
without official sponsorship. On the other hand, merchants could use their 
wealth to escape their status by investing in education. In Ming-Ch'ing 
times, merchants and their sons were allowed to take the examinations and 
to acquire official gentry rank. In the absence of effective barriers to elite 
status, they thus had no incentive to challenge the existing Confucian social 
order. 7 
Nor, as Frederic Wakeman points out, did Chinese merchants adopt a 
distinct class manner or lifestyle of their own: "Emulating the gentry's 
status manner on a colossal scale, they consumed their capital con-
spicuously, dissipating the possibility of more productive investments and 
reaffirming the hegemony of the literati's high culture. There was a 
uniquely mad and millionarish quality to the 'salt fools' (yen tai-tzu) who 
lavished fortunes on mechanized toys, Lake T'ai rock decorations, and 
exotic pets, but this was still just a magnified perversion of gentry fashion. 
And for all the squander, families like the Ma clan of salt merchants not 
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only presided over one of the most famous literary salons of the eighteenth 
century and patronized many of the noted artists of the day, they also 
amassed private libraries of rare editions which were the envy of the Ch'ien-
lung Emperor.' ·• 
Even peasants and artisans were attracted by the carrot of social 
mobility offered by the examination system. The vast majority, of course, 
had no real possibility of attaining the necessary education, for formal 
education was overwhelmingly private in traditional China and beyond the 
financial reach of perhaps ninety percent of the population. Yet there were 
some educational opportunities for the poor and disadvantaged-most 
notably "charitable schools" (i-hsiieh) established by clans. 9 
Such schools might educate poor but promising clan members as a 
matter of Confucian altruism (and as an expression of the Confucian 
dictum that "in education there are no class distinctions"). But more often 
than not the motive was probably corporate self-interest. Success in the ex-
aminations brought prestige and perhaps wealth to the clan as a whole, 
making the investment in worthy candidates from any social class a wise 
one. Significantly, a number of clans expressly stipulated that educational 
priority be given to orphans and other poor clan members. It must be 
remembered, however, that the clan system was unevenly distributed in 
traditional China, being most highly developed in the southeast (especially 
Kwangtung and Fukien), well-organized and widely distributed in the lower 
and central Yangtze provinces, but rather underdeveloped and thinly 
distributed in the northern provinces. Educational opportunities for the 
poor thus varied from location to location.' 0 
Clans did more than provide educational opportunities. They were also 
an important means of transmitting elite values to all classes of society 
within the clan. The principal device was clan rules (tsung-kuei). These 
rules were compiled by the elite for the edification of all clan members. In 
the main they were Confucian in content, and included quotations from the 
classics, nee-Confucian writings, and other inspirational sources. They also 
often included imperial injunctions (sheng-yii) such as the K'ang-hsi em-
peror's so-called Sacred Edict, and excerpts from the Yung-cheng em-
peror's 10,000-word commentary to this work. Although district 
magistrates were supposed to give lectures on these imperial exhortations, 
most did so only occasionally and in a perfunctory manner. One suspects, 
therefore, that lectures on the clan rules in clan meetings provided a more 
effective channel for the communication of these ideas to commoners, at 
least within the clan itself. The basic concerns of the Sacred Edict, which 
were by and large those of the clan, included the encouragement of filial 
piety, respect for age, clan and community harmony, ritual and discipline, 
obedience to the law, avoidance of litigation, and avoidance of heretical 
sects. 
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Hui-chen Wang Liu has shown that orthodox Confucian concepts were 
adjusted somewhat in clan rules to conform to the realities of Chinese 
everyday life, especially to the outlook of commoners. She finds, for 
example, that many clan rules were an admixture of Confucianism, Bud-
dhism, Taoism, and folk religion. Some rules advised members to read the 
T'ai-shang kan-ying p'ien; others cited Buddhist authority for sanction; still 
others allowed Buddhist images to be placed next to ancestral tablets in the 
clan shrine. Through such forms of accommodation, the clan rules-like 
vernacular literature-provided a convenient meeting point between elite 
and popular culture. 
Clan solidarity, and adherence to clan rules, were based in part on the 
clan's ability to impose punishments on its members, ranging from 
reprimands and fines to corporal punishment and expulsion. 11 But the 
practice of collective ancestor worship also provided a strong sense of group 
cohesiveness and conformity within the clan. The ancestral temple, which 
was usually the largest and most impressive clan building, was a powerful 
reminder of the link between the dead and the living, the past and the 
present. Tiered rows of spirit tablets, sometimes numbering over a 
thousand, were organized by generations on the clan ancestral altar. 
Around them were plaques of honorific titles bestowed by the government 
on the clan's illustrious sons, and moral exhortations left by clan fore-
fathers to inspire moral behavior an~ promote positive ambition among 
their posterity. 
In this environment, many collective clan sacrifices took place every 
year on important occasions such as the birth or marriage of clan sons, and 
important festivals such as those of spring, autumn, and New Year's. These 
rites, and the clan feasts that followed, "helped to perpetuate the memory 
of the traditions and historical sentiments of the group, sustain its moral 
beliefs, and revivify group consciousness. Through these rites and the 
presence of the group in its full numerical strength, the clan periodically 
renewed its sentiments of pride, loyalty, and unity.'" 2 
What ancestor worship did for the clan, it also did for the Chinese 
nuclear family. By late imperial times, family ancestor worship had become 
a cultural universal in China. Even kinship-renouncing Buddhist monks 
observed mourning rites for their parents. Enriched by Confucian, Bud-
dhist, and Religious Taoist ideas, ancestor worship buttressed the Chinese 
family system and fostered a profound precedent-mindedness at all levels of 
society. Important decisions within the family required "consultation" with 
the ancestors, whose wishes or interests could not be ignored without risk. 
Peasants and emperors alike were acutely aware of their filial respon-
sibilities to departed ancestors. 
It is not surprising that the policies of the Ch'ing government were 
often closely linked to the practice of ancestor worship. On the one hand, 
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the state sought to maintain order through negative sanctions by addressing 
the most compelling concerns of the ancestral cult. Rebel leaders, for 
example, stood the chance of having their entire families wiped out and 
their ancestral tombs destroyed. Punishments such as mutilation of the 
body (a gift from one's ancestors) and banishment (detachment from the 
clan and natal community) were clearly designed as deterrents to the filial-
minded. On the other hand, the state actively supported ancestor worship as 
a matter of Confucian conviction. Officials were required to withdraw from 
duty for up to three years of mourning upon the death of a parent, and the 
Ch 'ing legal code (Ta-Ch 'ing lii-li) even stipulated that criminals convicted 
of capital offenses might be allowed to receive a greatly reduced penalty and 
to remain at home in order to continue family sacrifices if they were the sole 
male heirs of deceased parents. 13 
Confucian values mitigated the law in other significant ways. 
Punishments, for example, were meted out within the family system ac-
cording to the five official degrees of mourning relationships (wu-fu). These 
relationships were based on the superiority of the senior generation over the 
junior generation, and the male over the female. Thus, a son who struck or 
beat a parent (degree 1 relationship) was liable to decapitation, irrespective 
of whether or not injury resulted, but no penalty applied to a parent who 
beat a son (degree 2b), unless the son died. Likewise, a wife who struck her 
husband (degree I) received a hundred blows of the heavy bamboo, but a 
husband who struck his wife (degree 2a) was punished only if he inflicted a 
significant injury-and then only if the wife personally lodged a complaint 
with the authorities. The penalty for beating a first cousin once removed 
(degree 4) was one year of penal servitude plus sixty blows of the heavy 
bamboo; it was one and one-half years plus seventy blows for beating a first 
cousin (degree 3). Perhaps the most astonishing feature of the Ch'ing code 
was its stipulation that accusations by subordinate members of a family 
against their superiors would entail legal punishment for the reporter, even 
if true. The false accusation of a father by his son was punished by 
strangulation, but a true report (except in the case of treason or rebellion) 
still brought a penalty of three years penal servitude plus one hundred blows 
of the heavy bamboo.,. 
In several respects, the Ch'ing government's policy toward religious 
life at the local level outside the family and the clan paralleled its policy 
toward ancestor worship. In each case, the state's ultimate aim was to 
ensure social harmony and control. To the extent, therefore, that religious 
sacrifices supported state authority or improved popular morale, officials 
actively encouraged them. As we have noted, the Ch'ing authorities 
periodically called upon Buddhist and Taoist priests to say prayers in times 
of trouble, and officials themselves undertook state religious sacrifices to 
various local deities, including Kuan-ti and the City God (ch 'eng-huang).' 5 
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Emperors bestowed on local gods honorific titles, which were dutifully 
inscribed on temple plaques and tablets in the fashion of clan ancestral 
halls. Officials adopted deities from popular religion and bureaucratized 
them (the City God, for example, was the otherworldly [yin] equivalent of the 
district magistrate [yang] at the hsien level), while the common people, for 
their part, worshipped gods that were like "magic officials."' 6 Arthur Wolf 
goes so far as to say: "Assessed in terms of its long-range impact on the 
people, [the Chinese imperial government] appears to have been one of the 
most potent governments ever known, for it created a religion in its own 
image."" 
The Ch'ing government did everything in its power to control Chinese 
religious life. This included not only close supervision over the regular 
Buddhist and Religious Taoist establishment, but also the prohibition of 
many diverse religious sects. Although ideologically willing to tolerate Bud-
dhism and Religious Taoism as doctrines that ''encourage what is good and 
reprove what is evil" (in the words of the Chia-ch'ing emperor), the 
state greatly feared the political power of organized religious movements. 
Thus, the Ch 'ing code specified that leaders of "heretical" organizations 
(i.e., secret societies, broadly construed) were to be strangled, and their 
accomplices were to receive one hundred blows of the heavy bamboo and to 
be banished to a distance of three thousand /i (about one thousand miles). 
Even religious societies such as the Lung Hua sect, which placed great 
emphasis on Confucian ethics, did not escape harsh persecution by the 
Ch'ing government.' 8 Like the clan system itself, popular religion was 
viewed by the state as a potential threat as well as a source of support. ' 9 
The ideology of secret societies is a fascinating subject. We know, of 
course, that these organizations were condemned by the state as immoral 
(yin), perverse (yao), and heterodox (hsieh). Their social base consisted 
primarily of poor peasants and "marginal and destitute elements" of towns 
and villages, including monks, transport workers, and vagabonds. Yet, as 
Jean Chesneaux indicates, "no matter how badly oppressed the secret 
societies were and how strong their hostility to the established order, they 
always remained within that order. The yin of the underground forces 
represented by the secret societies opposed the Confucian yang, but was at 
the same time attached to it by bonds of mutual interdependence. In the last 
analysis, ... secret societies were limited to fraternal action within the 
Confucian world."'° Frederic Wakeman provides apt illustration of this 
point, indicating, for example, that the transformation of Chu YUan-chang 
from sectarian leader into founder and first emperor of the Ming dynasty 
may well have been "eased by certain ideological similarities between rebel 
heterodoxy and Confucian orthodoxy."" Philip Kuhn's discussion of 
"orthodox" and "heterodox" models of social organizations in Ch 'ing 
China not only assumes that "differences in political and ideological 
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orientation . . did not necessarily involve differences in scales and modes 
of organization," but also warns against the dangers of "differentiating too 
sharply between ... [orthodox and heterodox organizations] on grounds 
of supposed ideological differences. " 22 
Such organizational and ideological affinities between orthodox and 
unorthodox social groupings in traditional China may help explain the 
endurance of the dynastic system in the face of frequent peasant uprisings. ' 3 
But other cultural factors were also at work, limiting revolutionary change 
and undergirding the traditional social order. One of these was the close 
relationship between city and countryside in post-Sung times. 
The cities of late imperial China were very much unlike their coun-
terparts in medieval and early modern Europe. One difference was, of 
course, the preponderant role of the state in urban affairs in China. 24 
Another was the cosmological significance of the Chinese walled city, and 
the persistent yin-yang / five elements symbolism associated with it. 25 Yet 
another was the absence in China of religious structures comparable in size 
and importance to those in Western cities. Also significant is that fact that 
no Chinese building was obviously datable by a particular period style: 
"Time did not challenge time in the eyes of a wanderer in a city street in 
traditional China .... No traditional Chinese city ever had a Romanesque 
or a Gothic past to be overlaid in a burst of classical renascence, or a Vic-
torian nightmare to be scorned in an age of aggressive functionalism." 26 
But the most significant difference of all was the lack of a sharp urban-rural 
distinction in traditional Chinese cultural life. 
It would be a mistake to exaggerate urban-rural uniformities in China. 
The mingling of merchants and gentry in urban areas, for example, must 
have affected the cultural tone of city life, which was undoubtedly more 
intense and cosmopolitan than life in the countryside. 2 7 Yet the outstanding 
feature of Chinese cultural life in late imperial times is its perceptible unity 
along an urban-rural continuum. In the Ch 'ing period, only about twenty-
five percent of the Chinese elite had permanent urban residences. Although 
in their capacity as officials, members of the elite necessarily resided in 
urban areas, the majority came from the countryside and returned to the 
countryside upon retirement. 28 No significant differences existed between 
urban and rural elites regarding housing, dress, eating and drinking habits, 
transport, and general cultural style. Many famous centers of learning were 
located in rural areas, as were great libraries and art collections. Just as 
there was no major gulf between the capital and the provinces in the 
cultural life of the Chinese elite, so there was no glaring cultural distance 
between the city and the countryside. 29 
What can be identified is a set of contrasting elite attitudes toward 
urban-rural relations that may be viewed as a reflection of yin-yang 
complementary thinking. In office, Chinese scholars tended to emphasize 
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the "civilizing" functions of the city; out of office they esteemed the purity 
of the rural sector. 30 Institutionally, the elite served predominantly public 
interests in one capacity and primarily private interests in another. Thus a 
gentry member might well be an upright and incorruptible magistrate 
outside his native place, but return home to use his bureaucratic influence 
and social status to acquire private property, to obtain preferential treat-
ment in taxation, and to protect kinship interests. As Frederic Wakeman 
says, "Local social organization ... embodied contrary principles: in-
tegration into the imperial system and autonomy from it. The dynamic 
oscillation between these poles created the unity of Chinese society, not by 
eliminating the contradictions but by balancing them in such a way as to 
favor overall order. The balance was expressed in ideal terms as a Con-
fucian compromise between Legalist intervention and complete laissez-
faire. " 3 ' 
In all, then, the key to stability and cultural continuity in late imperial 
China was the homeostatic balance that existed between different types of 
thought, different forms of social and political organization, and even 
different areas of residence. In times of dynastic vigor, this balance was also 
evident in the rapport (kan-ch 'ing) that existed between peasants and the 
elite, tenants and landlords. In the heyday of the dynasty, there was con-
siderable geographic and social mobility as well as a substantial amount of 
elite-commoner interaction within the traditional village and especially the 
cellular market structure. The markets and fairs that brought merchants 
from dispersed places to a common center "fostered cultural exchange 
among local systems within the trading area in question," while the travels 
of successful scholars to far-flung places "increased their social and 
cultural versatility and enlarged the cultural repertoire from which they 
could draw on their return home. " 32 Within their wider local community, 
peasants were exposed to "diverse customs, alien values, and exogenous 
norms-elements originating not only in other communities like their own 
but also in cities, elements drawn not only from other little traditions but 
also from the great tradition of the imperial elite. " 33 In contrast to many 
other traditional peasant communities, local systems in rural China were 
wide open in the heyday of the dynasty. Social and cultural integration was 
substantial. 
But in periods of dynastic decline, local communities in China began to 
close up. Resistance to exogenous cultural influences arose and economic 
closure ensued; local society became increasingly militarized, and tensions 
increased between elites and commoners. 34 At the same time, urban-rural 
and gentry-peasant friction developed as landlords fled the countryside for 
the relative security of the cities. 3 ' This was the situation which Westerners 
encountered and described in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
China. It was not invariably so. 
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The decline of the Ch 'ing dynasty, which has been described in detail 
many times, was hastened by unprecedented population growth. From 1650 
to 1850, China's population quadrupled to over 400 million, creating an 
increasingly unfavorable population to land ratio, monumental economic and 
administrative problems, and severe social strain. These developments only 
exacerbated the deterioration of government that had already begun in the 
latter part of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign. 36 Yet even so, the unique 
homeostatic feedback mechanisms of traditional China might have righted 
the imbalance-at least temporarily. 37 But the Western impact in the mid-
nineteenth century brought a combined political, economic, and cultural 
challenge to the Ch'ing dynasty that could not be met without revolutionary 
change. Nonetheless, the striking feature of China's response to the 
Western challenge throughout most of the nineteenth century was the 
continued strength of the old order, and its remarkable ability to coopt or 
rationalize new elements in time-honored style. 38 The contrast with Japan is 
illuminating. 39 
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